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1. Introduction: measuring human progress
Most of the world accepts the year 2000 as a milestone of symbolic signi"cance. But
milestones measure only distance. So critics may object to endowing the end of
a millennium, or of a century, with any special historic signi"cance denied to the end
of any other decade. Yet lengthy eons, neatly rounded o!, provide a convenient
time-frame for measuring human progress including progress in the management of
ocean and coastal areas.
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1For a recent account of daily life in England in the year 1000, see [1].
2Despite the lack of impressive technological contributions to human improvement at the end of the "rst
millennium, England at least was a greener and pleasanter land by any modern environmental test. Nine
out of ten lived `on a simple, wholesome diet that grew sturdy limbs* and very health teeth. It was during
the centuries that followed the "rst millennium that overpopulation and overcrowding started to a!ect the
stature of well-being of western Europeans.a [1, p. 9]. So we might do well to avoid the `snobbery of
chronologya. Civilization since then has not improved in every way. `We certainly have more facts at our
disposal. We have more wealth, both personal and national, better technology, and in"nitely more skilful
ways of preserving and extending our lives. But whether we today display more wisdom or common
humanity is an open question, and so when we look back to discover how people coped with the daily
di$culties of existence a thousand years ago, we might also consider whether, in all our sophistication, we
could meet the challenges of their world with the same fortitude, good humour, and philosophy.a [1, p.
201].
3The year 1900 is a convenient landmark in the history of international law to the extent it marks
(approximately) the high-water mark of what might be called the `transactionala period of development,
which preceded the `organizationala period. It was also the year of the Paris Exposition and numerous
scienti"c and intellectual congresses devoted to greeting the `new dawna of civilization. Many European
international lawyers of that era were also advocates of comparative law, which was seen as a cognate
discipline designed in part to facilitate the elucidation of general principles common to `civilizeda systems
of national law. The "rst congress on comparative law was held in Paris in 1900 in association with the
Exposition.
The year 1000 A.D. was witness, it seems, to a virtually unchanging succession of
humdrum daily lives marked by wonder and dread.1 Human existence was elevated
only, if at all, by a sense of mystery. The conceptualization of human accomplishment
had barely begun.2
Arguably, the modern secular concept of human progress was globalized only a few
centuries ago, despite earlier claims to universal values and norms promoted within
a number of cultural traditions. International lawyers may be excused for taking some
pride in the contribution their discipline has made to the concept and goal of global
civilization since the late 16th century. Yet until the new centennial dawn of 1900,3 the
ethos of public international law was chie#y restricted to protection of the principles
of reciprocity and mutuality inherent in bilateral arrangements among the nominally
equal sovereign states of the Western world. It has been left to the 20th century to
articulate the hopes and visions of a truly globalized `world communitya. Ironically,
this extraordinary leap forward was taken in a century dis"gured by appalling wars,
famines and atrocities, sustaining the tragic myth that the prospect of catastrophe is
necessary to fundamental improvements in the human condition.
Two thousand years ago the Roman concept of world community was built upon
the general convenience of treating the ocean generically as if it belonged to a separate,
extra-national, legal order: either the property of no one (res nullius) or the common
property of all users (res communis) [2]. Over the last two millennia most Western
universalists looked primarily to the ocean as the best single hope of developing
a truly global system of transnational law, built on reason, even if it rested on shared
convenience rather than a universal sense of morality. By the end of the second
millennium the ocean has been joined by the environment as an extremely broad
avenue to explore for the advance of global civilization through the application of
reason and the concept of common interest. Unlike the law of the sea, which evolved
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4For a discussion of community interests, see [3].
5Edith Brown Weiss estimates there are over 900 international legal instruments having one or more
provisions addressing the environment, see [6].
6Human rights instruments comprise 20 universal treaties, more than a dozen regional conventions and
scores of soft law instruments [7].
7For recent reviews of marine ecosystem threats, see Health Ecological and Economic Dimensions
(HEED) of Global Change Program, Marine Ecosystems: Emerging Diseases as Indicators of Change, online:
Shttp://heed.unh.edu/heedreport/T (date accessed, 26 June 1999); World Wildlife Fund, Turning Up the
Heat: How Global Warming Threatens Life in the Sea, online: Shttp://www.worldwildlife.org/climate/
oceans.pdfT (date accessed, 26 June 1999) and [8].
through accommodation with ancient and persistent prerogatives of special interest,
the new "eld of international environmental law (IEL) o!ers the opportunity to evolve
essentially on the basis of a globalized vision of world community.4
Today, at the dawn of a new millennium, we might feel entitled to a degree of
optimism that the current integration or convergence of the law of the sea (with its
main emphasis on state entitlements) and international environmental law (with its
main emphasis on state responsibilities) will result in a strengthening of the world
community's legal framework for protection of the ocean/coastal environment. But
the truth seems to be more complicated: we are witness rather to a mixture of `upsa
and `downsa. At the same time, this "eld shows signs of `swimminga, `sinkinga, and
`treading watera.
Evidence of successful `swimmingamay include the entry into force and widespread
acceptance of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [4] which seems likely
to endure as the `constitution of the oceansa. Not least, the environmental provisions
of the famous Convention, though often generally worded, are unlikely to lose their
status as `sacred texta. Hopefully, the same will hold true for the carefully crafted
procedures for the management of ocean disputes, including con#icts of an environ-
mental nature [5]. But the year 2000 is still too early to assess the utility of these
procedural provisions.
Throughout the period of UNCLOS III, and in the following years when the 1982
UN Convention was gathering support, in its revised form, environmental diplomacy
was displaying an extraordinary burst of vitality. Inspired and publicized by the two
largest of UN-sponsored mega-conferences, the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (UNCED), IEL has grown
almost exponentially by virtue of hundreds of negotiated instruments, displaying an
unparalleled diversity of legal, quasi-legal, and political commitments incurred by parti-
cipating states, and indirectly by the institutions of `civil societya.5 Even the international
law of human rights, which has generated scores of major treaties and instruments
over the last half-century6 has not matched IEL's record over the last 30 years.
However, `sinkinga feelings also seem appropriate in light of environmental battles
lost and opportunities overlooked. Environmental degradation of ocean and coastal
areas continues: numerous "sheries are overexploited; coral bleaching incidents are
rampant, threatening marine biodiversity; toxic chemicals lace all seas, including
polar areas; diseases in marine fauna and #ora are on the increase; and eutrophication
is expanding due to phosphate, nitrate and sediment loadings of marine estuaries.7
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8 IMO is continuing work on the development of mandatory regulations on ballast water management.
However, the Marine Environment Protection Committee has not reached agreement on various issues
such as the categories of vessels to be covered and the extent of ocean areas subject to controls. Therefore,
convening of an international conference for text adoption is not planned in the beinnium 2000}2001. See
Report of the Secretary-General, Oceans and the law of the sea. UN GA 54th sess., UN Doc. A/54/429
(1999), par.420.
9For a review of the "rst session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an Internationally
Legally Binding Instrument on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) held from June 29 to July 3,
1998, see [15].
10This paper does not speci"cally address the need to integrate the various branches of international law
related to environmental protection, including trade law and human rights law. For a discussion of the
challenge, see [22].
Global conventions are lacking in key areas, including land-based marine pollution,
seabed activities, and protection of forests; nor has a legal regime for protecting
marine biodiversity of the deep seabed been forged [9,10]. No binding rules govern
the exchange of ballast water from ships and associated introduction of alien species
and pathogens in o!shore zones,8 and no global liability regime yet covers spills of
bunker fuels from ships [11]. Numerous cracks remain in the climate change regime,
including minimal emission cut-back commitments by developed countries and the
need to work out the operational details of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, including
emission trading and the clean development mechanism [12]. Global e!orts to
control hazardous chemicals have been quite weak [13]. A prior informed consent
procedure rather than a prohibitory approach has been taken to manage interna-
tional trade in banned or severely restricted chemicals [14]. Negotiations for a global
convention on persistent organic pollutants (POPs) are initially targeting only 12
chemicals, `the dirty dozena.9 A proactive and highly precautionary approach of only
allowing chemicals listed as `safea on the market is still opposed [16].
`Treading watera seems an apt description of regulatory e!orts in other contexts.
The global community seems content to stand pat with the Global Programme of
Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities
[17], rather than progress to the next stage of treaty making [18]. Countries are in no
hurry to develop global standards for o!shore oil and gas activities [19]. The world
community has rejected more radical proposals in ocean governance and interna-
tional environmental law-making, such as creation of an empowered UN Environ-
ment Organization [20] or appointment of an ocean guardian [21].
This paper examines seven challenging issues in the international environmental
law "eld,10 which at the very least promise to make for a `hard swima as countries
and citizens face the next millennium. Those challenges include: (1) coping with the
proliferation of negotiated environmental instruments; (2) overcoming political
opposition to environmental commitments; (3) clarifying the jurisprudential under-
pinnings of international environmental law; (4) sorting out the balance among
environmental ethics, science and the rule of law; (5) #eshing out and implementing
the principles of sustainable development; (6) addressing practical problems of imple-
menting international responsibilities; and (7) visioning paths of ocean governance for
the future.
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11Distributive agreements have been de"ned as `those primarily concerned with the distribution or
redistribution of resourcesa, such as those dealing with trade, aid, and cultural and scienti"c exchange [25].
12Demonstrative instruments, fundamentally de"ned, are `those designed, in general emotive or aspira-
tional language, to demonstrate or dramatize the parties' commitment to shared goals and values and
friendly relations.a [25, pp. 114}5].
13Administrative arrangements, similarly treated, are `those primarily concerned with the establishment
and maintenance of interstate services, re#ected in such issue areas as consular, banking, aviation, shipping,
railway, postal, and other communication servicesa [25, p. 114].
14Resolutive agreements are `those devoted essentially to the resolution of serious legal issues, such as
boundary delimination and nationality issues, which are amenable to &"nal' resolution and not merely
treatmenta [25].
15 In looking back at the years of implementation of most trade and other economic agreements, it would
be possible for economists to calculate the value of goods and services made subject to treaty regulation.
The same exercise might be extended to ancillary agreements in such areas as intellectual property,
investment, shipping, and commercial arbitration.
16For a treatment of environment law as hybrid in this cross-sectoral sense, &&See [26, 32].''
17On the problem of "nancing the implementation of international environmental treaties and existing
approaches, see [7, pp. 1458}1502].
2. Coping with the proliferation of negotiated environmental instruments
Depending on the generosity of one's de"nition of a `negotiated instrumenta, the
output of environmental diplomacy at the inter-state level since 1970 may be reckoned
at over 800. Admittedly, a large and growing proportion of these instruments fall
outside the traditionally narrow category of international agreements of `treaty
charactera [23]. This characteristic of environmental `treaty-makinga* heterogen-
eity* has forced legal theorists, with widely varying degrees of enthusiasm, to adopt
the late 20th century concepts of `soft lawa instruments and quasi-legal commitments
[24]. As discussed below, the preponderance of soft, informal, non-binding, ostensibly
non-adjudicable (or even unenforceable) commitments generated by IEL diplomacy
raises important jurisprudential questions. But initially even more fundamental issues
arise from the proliferation of these instruments.
Above all, the practical question of monetary cost must be addressed. To put the matter
in perspective, it might be useful to consider international agreements as falling into one
* and usually not more than one* of four general categories: distributive,11 demonstra-
tive,12 administrative,13 and resolutive.14 Normally, only those of the distributive family,
or more exactly those of the commercial/economic subset, seem amenable to calculation
of the potential economic costs and bene"ts associated with them.15 It is di$cult, if not
impossible, to quantify the economic costs and bene"ts associated with non-distributive
instruments of the demonstrative, administrative and resolutive kinds. But many environ-
mental agreements, and especially the most ambitious, are hybrid, in the sense that they
encompass most or all of the four functions. Indeed the cross-functional orientation of
environmental instruments marks them out as unique among all the major categories of
`treaty-makinga in the modern, post-1970 era.16 It is this cross-functional uniqueness that
makes it especially di$cult to cost the tasks of implementation and compliance
associated with the outcome of IEL diplomacy. Yet, however di$cult to quantify, the
costs are enormous, likely much higher than for any other general category.17
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18An example of a broad range of actors being encouraged to "nance technological and management
responses to an IEL challenge is found in the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-based Activities where a long list of suggested funding sources is attached.
19The polluter pays principle, originally proposed by the OECD Council in 1972, is often broadened to
include the notion of user pays and still faces many challenges in implementation including the need to
develop greener accounting systems for valuing ecological services and e!ects. See [7, pp. 382}5].
20The common concern of humankind principle partly captures the evolution where both biodiversity
protection and climate change are considered to adversely a!ect all humanity and to require actions in the
long-term interests of the world community. See [7, pp. 343}5].
In practice throughout the 1990s, the problem of compliance cost has become an
increasingly serious concern for negotiators of global/environmental treaties and
similar, strenuously negotiated, treaty-like instruments, which are intended to create
expectations of compliance, in some degree, even in the absence of strictly binding
obligations and the prospect of `enforcementa in an operational sense. The recent
response has been to envisage a gradation of responsibility in accordance with the
participant state's capacity and its eligibility for international assistance, which may
be available for capacity-building purposes. It remains to be seen what degree of
operational reality can be brought to the `common but di!erentiateda approach to
the implementation problem in the IEL "eld [27]. Those disposed to be pessimistic
about the consequences of ambitiously expensive treaty-making for the developing
and least developed nations, many of them now wracked by economic set-backs, may
wonder if the international community is not becoming overwhelmed by the sheer
volume of IEL commitments generated in the last three decades of the 20th century.
On the other hand, to those prepared to indulge in closely monitored optimism, the
#ourishing of IEL diplomacy in recent decades might be seen as a challenge to
diplomatic, political, or social ingenuity. The concept of `stakeholders' responsibilitya
has been invoked as a serious, though admittedly idealistic, approach to the "nancing
of major global undertakings involving enormous costs.18 The wider the range of
stakeholder interests and concerns envisaged, the more widely the cost of implementa-
tion can be spread. Such an approach has been advocated for an e!ective, systematic,
preventive approach to recurring regional environmental disasters such as the land
and forest burnings in Southeast Asia, which give rise to the `seasonal hazea phenom-
enon and the health and environmental hazards related to it [28].
The `polluter paysa principle has an important role in the development of IEL,
mostly in bilateral situations where identi"able corporate `culpritsa can be forced to
carry most of the cost burden on the ethical ground of culpability.19 However,
complex environmental commitments that require restructuring of industries, econo-
mies, and even societies, cannot be "nanced entirely by culpable enterprises or
agencies. In such circumstances, simple morality may have to give way to a more
complicated concept of community responsibility, and the `communitya of stakeholder
interests and concerns may have to be very broadly, if not globally, conceived.20
The current proliferation of environmental instruments, if continued at the present
rate, may reach a level of diminishing returns, where the currency of expectation will
be debased by the frequency of reference to the goals which they promote. There is no
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21 It was argued, for example, that the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment consisted of
emergent norms of customary international law [29]. Similar hopes were entertained for the draft principles
on marine pollution prevention and control, see [30].
denying the impact of environmentalism in numerous cultures, at all levels of society.
Yet in many other countries the political leadership seems to believe it is su$cient to
be seen to accede to the goals of IEL through international participation, or through
signature or even occasional rati"cation. Environmentalists in these countries look in
vain for an operationally serious commitment to substantial, or at least reasonable,
compliance on the basis of politically or economically signi"cant reforms at the
national level. As IEL instruments escalate, it becomes increasingly di$cult to
establish priorities as a matter of national strategy, especially in developing and least
developed nations, and easier to denigrate the `impositionsa of the international
community. In short, the mounting volume of such instruments, mostly in non-treaty
form, may result in the lowering of the political credibility of IEL diplomacy in the
eyes of tough-minded decision-makers and their economically hard-pressed constitu-
ents, even if they feel obliged to acknowledge the legitimacy of environmental goals at
the level of idealism or rhetoric.
3. Overcoming political opposition to environmental commitment
In the three years preceding the 1972 Stockholm Conference it proved politically
impossible to persuade most of the developing country governments that environ-
mental commitment was not a further barrier to rapid economic development.
Proposals to use the Stockholm arena as a treaty-making opportunity had to be
abandoned. Environmentalists were left only with the hope that a world conference of
unprecedented magnitude would contribute to the gradual raising of environmental
consciousness, and legal reformists with the hope that the norms endorsed by the
delegations would "nd their way into the corpus of customary, rather than conven-
tional, international law.21
About 30 years later, one looks back in admiration at the amount of diplomatic
energy and ingenuity expended since the Stockholm Conference on the creation of an
ethical, and politically acceptable, environmental modus vivendi between the de-
veloped and developing worlds in such diverse contexts as nature conservation,
regulation of nuclear energy, protection of threatened or endangered species and
habitat areas, "shery conservation and management, pollution prevention and con-
trol, and the control of hazardous substances. Success in negotiating so many
instruments, many on issues that would have seemed too controversial during the
North}South debates of the late 1960s, may be attributed to a wide variety of factors:
general recognition of the failure of most natural resource management regimes; fear
of nuclear, chemical, and other hazards; acknowledgment that sound development
strategy requires balance among long-, medium-, and short-term considerations,
under the rubric of sustainability; discovery that framework and other non-binding
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22 In particular, Dr. Mahathir, the nationalist prime minister of Malaysia, has served as a lightning rod,
attracting the wrath of the Western press by his outspoken criticisms of Western impositions on developing
economies. The recent reverses of developing regions like Southeast Asia have emboldened other third
world leaders to warn their electorates of the price that may have to be paid, if they capitulate to all
reformist demands made by Western powers. Regions such as Southeast Asia do, of course, follow global
trends in most IEL sectors with their own collective policy commitments, usually expressed in non-binding
instruments, but failure to implement conscientiously or e!ectively at the national level may be ascribed to
(often unacknowledged) reservations about the economic fairness of such demands upon them, see [32].
23For a discussion of the role of international "nancial institutions in environmental protection see [7,
pp. 1458}89].
forms of `treaty-makinga o!er a useful, but non-threatening, collective goal for IEL
diplomacy; acceptance of consensus and other practical, time-saving techniques to
facilitate and accelerate global conference negotiation processes; and experimentation
with di!erential concepts designed to soften the rigidities of the traditional state-
equality doctrine, such as the `common but di!erentiateda approach to certain
ambitious and costly environmental conventions [7, pp. 358}60].
However, research of the third decade of the IEL era, focussing on problems of
implementation and compliance [31], has shown how much resistance there still is to
the kinds of reform required to bring the regulatory systems of most non-developed
nations into conformity with globally negotiated standards of environmental respons-
ibility. In varying degrees, their reluctance to conform re#ects suspicion that de-
veloped (mostly Western) governments, in driving the evolving IEL system, are not
entirely motivated by sel#ess concerns about the state of the world environment. The
truth is that most basic environmental concerns are too closely linked to economic
interests to dispel the fear of many developing countries that the tightening of their
environmental standards, in conformity with ambitious global instruments, would
raise the costs of national development and place them in a state of comparative
disadvantage in the increasingly globalized market-place. Despite the many apparent
successes of IEL diplomacy over the last 30 years, the Stockholm fears of the South
were not so far below the surface at the end of the 1990s.
One of the most troubling questions is whether anti-capitalist (anti-market or
anti-Western) politicians in certain non-developed countries will succeed in in#uenc-
ing others to discredit IEL in general as a cynical strategy `imposeda on their faltering
economies. Third world fears of the `international communitya may be even more
widespread than the speeches of nationalist politicians re#ect. Part of third world
resentment is, more or less explicitly, directed against the hegemony of the United
States, the single great power, with its almost irresistible in#uence on many of the
most powerful global organizations. In Asia especially, the recent economic recession
seems to have sti!ened the resolve of some developing countries not to be bullied by
external interests, nor swept away by external, nominally global, environmental
concerns with cost implications.22
`Conditionalitya, the practice of imposing environmental, human rights, and other
conditions on loans and grants by global institutions such as IMF and the World
Bank, is as much a political weapon as a policy of benevolence in the increasingly
tough-minded world of development assistance.23 It is clear, however, that revelations
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24For a review of the numerous transitions urged under the rubric of sustainable development including
demographic, energy, resource, economic and political transitions, see [33].
25See e.g. the critical discussion in [34].
26For a review of the intellectual ascendancy of positivism, see [35].
of large-scale, and apparently endemic, corruption, collusion and nepotism in many of
these resentful and IEL-resistant states have virtually destroyed any hope of reversion
to the softer-hearted policies of the 1970s and 1980s. In the next decade, third world
critics of `conditionalityawill have to show high standards of public morality at home
to be widely accepted as entitled to the prerogative of moral outrage.
Perhaps more di$cult is the question whether the global, Brundtland-inspired
concept of `sustainabilitya has jelled su$ciently to provide a solid rationale for
long-term environmental commitments that involve a considerable sacri"ce of short-
term developmental gains.24 Many academic specialists have taken the position that
the case for sustainability, as an operationally meaningful, overriding goal of socio-
economic development, has yet to be made, at least at the level of intellectual rigour
demanded by the relevant disciplines.25 Is equilibrium an illusion? Commonsense
might suggest that the debate boils down to a choice of time-frame for sensible
planning. Extremists arguing for in"nite (or inde"nite) resource renewability, without
knowledge of future science and technology, should not expect to carry the day.
Scare-mongering, on the other hand, might be defensible, if it seems to be the only way
of bringing about a massive reduction of human numbers in an increasingly overcrow-
ded planet. Where global catastrophe is a real possibility, rationality and restraint
may prove to be an inadequate response.
4. Clarifying the jurisprudential underpinnings of IEL
In the infancy period of modern international law * in its "rst two centuries of
growth * there was a rather evenly contested struggle between two deeply divided
schools of jurisprudence: the naturalists and the positivists. The natural law school
held out a vision of an emergent legal system growing out of a stock of universally
valid principles based on reason, transcending political systems and cultural tradi-
tions. The positive law school rooted international law in the "rmer clay of state
practice, and especially in the evidence of formal consent, which was the prerogative of
sovereignty-holders to grant or withhold in their transactional, mostly bilateral,
relationships with their collateral counterparts.26 The 19th century saw a gradual, but
eventually decisive, shift in favour of the positivist model of international law, so that
by 1900 it appeared clear that the naturalists had been dislodged from the pragmatic
mainstream and obliged to defend themselves against charges of utopianism [36].
But international law has always been a re#ector of the world of diplomacy, resting
on political foundations, and the 1900}2000 period has seen enormous changes in the
structure, compositions, and tempo of inter-state diplomacy. The establishment of the
League of Nations and the United Nations in the "rst half of the 20th century paved
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27The analogy has been under challenge for at least 70 years. See [23, pp. 47}50] and [25]. For
a discussion of the multiparty and multiagency complexities in many treaty negotiations, see [21] at 47.
28For a discussion of the use of consensus procedures at UNCLOS III, see [37].
29For a review of compliance-inducement strategies, see [38].
30For a review of the broadening concept of state responsibility, see [39].
the way for the formation of numerous international organizations and agencies,
creating thousands of arenas and sub-arenas for global and regional diplomacy over
virtually the entire spectrum of public life. By the mid-20th century the old system of
classical diplomacy, involving only a small elite of professional diplomats with
expertise in con"dential and mostly bilateral transactions, had largely given way to
the more broadly interactive and more open processes of conference diplomacy.
In several ways this transformation in the structure and dynamic of modern (post
World War II) diplomacy has undermined the premises of the positivist school of
international law. Not least, the charters and covenants, which have been drawn up as
`sacred textsa of the (now) massively organized world community, have elevated
naturalist norms and prescriptions, buttressed by signatures, rati"cations and other
evidences of formal state consent, so as to restore something like the 18th century
balance between the two famous schools of jurisprudence. Moreover, the force of
numbers of member or participant states, negotiating together under so many organ-
izational auspices, has exposed the fragility of the traditional positivist analogy
between treaty and contract.27 The introduction of adoption by consensus as a pro-
cedural requirement of contemporary global diplomacy has contributed further to the
weakening of state sovereignty prerogative expressed preemptively through the denial
of formal consent.28 Above all, the chief purpose in many sectors of global, and even
regional, conference diplomacy is often to generate commitments among all the
participants in the process rather than to create obligations on the part of those
sovereignty-holders that choose to become parties through the subsequent grant of
formal state consent. Admittedly, the generation of commitment in the "rst phase of
legal development, through conference diplomacy, does not necessarily displace the
need for, or deny the value of, subsequent formal consent, but the formalistic
distinction between the two is more relevant to the juridical task of adjudication of
disputes than to the operational tasks of implementation and compliance-induce-
ment.29
Perhaps in no other sector of international law do these changes have more
jurisprudential impact than in the area of IEL, not only because of the frequency of
resort to global conference diplomacy for the setting of world community environ-
mental norms, but also because IEL adds exclusively to the burden of state responsib-
ility, unlike most other major `treaty-makinga contexts (such as law of the sea), which
are equally, or almost equally, concerned with the conferment of entitlements.30 In
short, IEL has become a juridical combat zone, attracting the tank-force of environ-
mentalist delegations, backed up by legions of `irregularsa representing the `transna-
tional ethical communitya, but slowed down, if not halted, outside the diplomatic
arena, by home-based positivists opposed to the radicalism of the entire enterprise of
`world community developmenta, through natural law prescriptions.
150 D.M. Johnston, D.L. VanderZwaag / Ocean & Coastal Management 43 (2000) 141}161
31For example, in the case of Southeast Asia, where the widespread, systematic burning of lands and
forests in Indonesia and elsewhere creates extremely serious air pollution problems throughout the region,
ASEAN has been forced to accept problem-solving responsibility, even at the risk of infringing its
established policy of non-interference. No one suggests that this transboundary environmental problem is
amendable to adjudication. For an overview of this problem, see [41].
32On the role of world conferences, including environmental conferences, in international legal develop-
ment, see [42].
33The World Conservation Union (IUCN) was founded by the famous biologist and humanist, Sir Julian
Huxley, during his tenure as the "rst Secretary-General of UNESCO in the years immediately following the
Second World War. Humanist ethic can perhaps also be detected in the life and works of other early
ecologists such as John Muir and Gi!ord Pinchot, see [43].
Even if some readers believe this argument is put too baldly, there can surely be no
doubt that the IEL phenomenon, and especially the `soft lawa emergence, has reduced
the ascendancy of the positivist school in contemporary international law. In the year
2000 it seems highly unlikely that we are on the brink of a massive reversal of current
trends in `world communitya governance. Environmental concern is very unlikely to
diminish; state systems will become more, not less, accountable to the `transnational
ethical communitya; the trend to diversi"cation of globally negotiated instruments
will continue through the early decades of the 21st century; and sovereignty-related
concepts, which form the infrastructure of the positivist model of international law,
will have to yield to less statist, more communitarian, constructs [40].
New challenges will arise. Faced with an apparent divergence between hard law and
soft law norms and instruments, will governments involved in transboundary environ-
mental disputes be encouraged to resort to adjudication as a mode of settlement,
trusting to judicial ingenuity to "nd a synthesis between the two modes of juridical
development? Or will they see such disputes as more suitable for political or non-
adjudicative treatment within regional organizations or through mediators and con-
ciliation commissions?31 Will the threatening, winner-take-all, ethos of litigation drive
most non-developed countries away from the adjudicative mode of settlement in the
case of environmental issues with potentially enormous cost implications? Will the
adjudications that do arise in the IEL "eld tilt the balance in favour of hard law norms
and considerations, possibly alienating much of the transnational ethical community
that puts stock in the `sacreda soft law of IEL? Will the codi"ed law of treaties,
bedrock of the positivist school, have to be revised in order to re#ect the new realities
of `treaty-makinga in the world community, especially in the context of IEL?32
5. Sorting out the balance among environmental ethics, science and the rule of law
Many writers on the growth of environmentalism have drawn attention to its
spiritual or quasi-religious character, although historically at least the nature conser-
vation sector of the environmental movement of the second half of the 20th century is
derived from humanism rather than organized religion.33 Saving the planet from
destruction does not rely on metaphysics or mysticism, but it tends to generate
a missionary fervour and energy that may be compared with the past and present
behaviour of prosyletizers of the great religions. Intense conviction and commitment
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34For a critique of the decision to ban ocean disposal of radioactive wastes in the ocean, see [44].
35On the inherent tensions between science and policy involving impartiality and disinterestedness on
the side and strategic behaviour and interest realization on the other, see [45].
36For a review of some of the reporting procedures and problems of actual reporting under IEL
agreements, see [47].
to the prescribed set of values * and beliefs that seem necessary to protect these
values * may result in what can be likened to a collective mind-set, a formidable,
world-wide coalition of extremely well-intentioned, like-minded enthusiasts with
potentially enormous political weight in a growing number of political cultures.
At the core of the world environment movement is a very sizeable elite of deter-
mined, well-educated, mostly middle-class, ethicists. As humanists, most of them draw
upon science and project a faith in human progress, but as ethicists with a program of
action in mind many are inclined to use science selectively rather than `objectivelya or
neutrally in the tradition of open inquiry. The `hard corea ethicist mind-set among
environmentalists has resulted in extreme policies (and sometimes extremist practices)
in a number of issue contexts: driftnet "shing, nuclear control, whaling, and the
dumping of hazardous wastes, to mention only a few.34 Usually, as noted above, such
issues tend to result in a confrontation between continuing a (revised) policy of
regulation and replacing it with a policy of prohibition. More often than not, the
policy of prohibition has won out.
In some situations prohibition may be the best course, at least in the short term, in
circumstances where it seems a shock must be administered to an industrial sector
that seems impervious to even a stringent system of regulatory controls. In some cases
structural reform may be the only e!ective remedy, and a reasoned case might be
made for it. But there are other, equally ethical, often even better informed, specialists
in environmental policy and resource management who reject the ideology of radical-
ism inherent in the prohibitionist school of contemporary environmentalism. Some
prohibitionists, unfortunately, in their determination to stamp out all environmental
evils, have chosen also to denigrate the mainstream of environmental scientists. The
result is that a gulf has opened up between many of the best-informed scientists, on the
one hand, and some of the largest, best endowed, and most politically in#uential
groups of environmental activists, on the other hand.35 Through e!ective lobbying,
emotional appeals to electorates, and other modes of political pressure * methods
alleged to be necessary to counter long-established and well-organized industrial
lobbies* environmental activists have succeeded in discrediting professionally scru-
pulous research and impugning the integrity of scientists, if their "ndings do not
support the goals and viewpoints of the activists. In a number of cases, external
political pressures have forced government agencies to suppress the "ndings of their
own, in-house scientists, without evaluation of the merits of their research [46].
The demoralization of the scienti"c community is a prospect that threatens the
healthy, fact-based, development of environmental policy and resource management
around the world. Moreover, the downgrading of scienti"c evidence also
poses a threat to the legal and managerial integrity of existing regulatory regimes that
depend on the observance of agreed-upon reporting procedures.36 Distorted
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information was placed before the UN General Assembly in order to carry the day in
promoting a resolution to ban all large-scale drift-nets regardless of the actual threat
to wildlife populations [48]. The International Whaling Commission has been `in-
#uenceda by anti-whaling activists, and its long-established practices for scienti"c
investigation and reporting overruled in a manner arguably dismissive of legal
procedure [49}51].
From these sobering re#ections, a number of important questions arise. Will
adversarial ethicists, acting mostly outside the inter-state system, tend to strengthen
or weaken IEL in the operational arena? To the extent that `civil societya extremists
meet with resistance on the part of government bureaucracies and industrial interests,
will IEL of the 21st century evolve along two divergent tracks, the populist-radical
and the reformist-coalitionist? Can the centre hold?
6. Fleshing out and implementing the principles of sustainable development
Perhaps the most important outcome of the Rio Conference was the new emphasis
on principled decision-making at the international, regional, national and local levels.
In the past international law had largely focused on jurisdictional rights and taken an
almost `hands o!a approach to interfering with national sovereignty including rights
to exploit natural resources. Through the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development and Agenda 2137 UNCED articulated numerous soft law principles
that promise to guide future law and policy reforms. Those principles, among others,
include integration, precaution, pollution prevention, intergenerational equity, pol-
luter pays, public participation, community-based management, indigenous rights
and women in development [53,54].
One of the greatest challenges will be to clarify the practical implications and ensure
legal implementation of the precautionary principle or approach [55,56]. Virtually no
informed opinion denies the need for caution in the use of the `humana environment
and the resources of the planet, given the continuing growth of world population.
Accordingly, no respectable opinion challenges the need for precautionary measures
in contexts where misuse or overuse may have reached a potentially dangerous level.
As in the case of the `sustainabilitya debate, the `precautionarya controversy comes
down to the degree of concern, alarmist to prudent, that should be re#ected in the
norms of IEL.
In a number of contexts, such as whaling, "shery management, and hazardous
substances, the issue is whether to continue to repose one's faith in regulation, despite
the unimpressive record of many regulatory regimes, or to resort to the simpler, and
ethically more satisfying, alternative of outright prohibition. This controversy might
be characterized as a con#ict between the rationality of the scienti"c community, on
the one hand, and popular ethics based on intuition, on the other: between the
optimism of the late 19th century, which witnessed the birth of regulatory systems
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38Wastes/materials allowed to be disposed of include: dredged material; sewage sludge; "sh wastes;
vessels and platforms; inert inorganic material; organic material of natural origin; and bulky items primarily
comprised of iron, steel, concrete and similarly unharmful materials.
39The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modi"ed by the
Protocol of 1978 is reprinted in [58,59].
40The International Maritime Organization, while aware of the need to incorporate the precautionary
approach, has been slow to clarify the operational implications. Through Resolution MEPC. 67(37) of
September 15, 1995 the Marine Environment Protection Committee adopted Guidelines on Incorporation
of the Precautionary Approach in the Context of Speci"c IMO Activities, but the Guidelines were
embraced on an interim basis until further experience with application is gained; also see [60].
41 This subsection is largely adopted from [61].
dependent on scienti"c evidence, and the pessimism arising from xn de siecle despair
at human greed or folly, which is once again fashionable at the end of the 20th century.
Regulation requires patience, faith in research, and the will to experiment; prohibition
repudiates expertise, trusts only experience, and takes no prisoners.
The best example of a global ocean management regime undergoing the `conver-
sion of precautiona is the London Convention 1972 and its 1996 Protocol [57]. While
the original Convention adopted an assimilative capacity approach to ocean dumping
through `black lista and `grey lista restrictions allowing most materials to be disposed
at sea subject to a permit requirement, the Protocol adopts the precautionary
approach through `reverse listinga whereby only wastes listed on a `safe lista will be
approved for ocean disposal and even then subject to waste audits.38
The precautionary principle will likely require revisiting other maritime environ-
mental standards and regulatory approaches in the future. For example, the vessel-
source pollution control standards under MARPOL largely follow a `pollution by
dilutiona and distance-from-land approach.39 Those rather archaic and simplistic
standards will likely come under increasing question.40
7. Addressing practical problems of implementing international responsibilities41
Clear and secure "nancing may be one essential component ensuring national
implementation of international sustainable development obligations. Training and
employing resource managers, development and transfer of environmentally sound
technologies, and undertaking law reform initiatives may be dependent upon ad-
equate "nancing.
A consistent shortcoming of the Rio Conventions, Agenda 21 and the follow-up
programs of action has been the lack of "rm and adequate "nancial commitments,
particularly by developed countries [62]. In Agenda 21 negotiations, developed
countries were not even willing to commit themselves to the UN goal of committing
0.7% of GNP for o$cial development assistance (ODA) by the year 2000 (Chapter 33,
para. 33.15 of Agenda 21). While the Secretariat of the Conference estimated 125
billion dollars would be required annually from the international community to assist
developing countries in implementing Agenda 21 (Chapter 33, para. 33.20 of Agenda
21), the level of funding has fallen far short. The Global Environment Facility (GEF),
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the key "nancing mechanism for assisting implementation of Agenda 21 and the
conventions on climate change and biological diversity, has not lived up to funding
expectations. Over US 2 billion dollars was committed by participating governments
over the 1995 } 1998 period which is far below Agenda 21 projections [63].
The Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment
from Land-based Activities provides no funding mechanism and no "nancial targets.
The Programme recognizes in general that "nancing for national and regional
programs of action should come from each country's own public and private sectors.
While urging the Global Environment Facility to "nance activities related to protec-
tion of the marine environment from land-based activities, the Programme stops short
of asking the GEF to create a separate funding window beyond the four existing
funding areas of climate change, biological diversity, ozone layer depletion and
international waters. Rather than ensuring funding, the Global Programme of Action
includes an illustrative list (in an Annex) of possible external sources of funding (for
a critique, see [17]). The Secretary-General's Report on Oceans and Seas to the
Seventh Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development in 1999 noted that
funding remains a major barrier to implementation of the GPA [64].
Progress in implementing the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Develop-
ment of Small Island Developing States has also su!ered from inadequate donor
support and continuing "nancial needs in following-up the Small Island Developing
State Programme. For example, bilateral donor support to small island developing
states was found to have declined substantially by 34% from the 1988}1990 period to
the 1991}1994 period [65]. The international community has been urged to provide
"nancial assistance for increasing shipping safety through such measures as purchase
of modern ships and construction of port reception facilities for ship wastes. Assist-
ance in acquiring more modern vessels has been reported as critical in light of the
statistic that some 70% of the merchant #eet of small island developing states is 15 yr
old and over [66].
At a meeting of representatives of donors and small island developing states in
February 1999, State representatives again emphasized the practical problems of
implementation:
[P]rogress in implementation 2 has been hampered by a number of factors,
most importantly, lack of "nancial support from the international community,
inadequate human resources with appropriate training, inadequate institutional
capacity, inadequate capacity for the enforcement of environmental legislation and
regulations and inadequate investment resources [67].
The Wider Caribbean Initiative on Ship Generated Waste (WCISW), a project
funded by the Global Environment Facility and administered by the World Bank to
promote implementation of MARPOL 73/78 in the Wider Caribbean Region (WCR),
has shed light on reasons, besides "nancial, for limited rati"cation of conventions by
countries. Among 29 countries of the WCR only 16 had rati"ed the Convention and
its mandatory Annexes as of July 1995. Lack of trained personnel, low political
priority given to maritime legislation and scarcity in legal drafting resources were
listed as contributing factors to the slow pace of rati"cation [68].
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Various innovative international "nancial mechanisms have been suggested to
assist countries in meeting sustainable development obligations, but the suggested
mechanisms have yet to be followed at the global level. A carbon tax levied on fossil
fuel use and based on carbon content has been suggested which might be earmarked
for reducing greenhouse emissions and assisting countries to adapt to sea level rise in
particular. A tax on airline transportation, possibly based on fuel consumption or
emissions of airline #eets, has also been raised. A tax on foreign exchange transactions
(the Tobin tax) has been suggested to "nance sustainable development activities. It is
estimated that a tax of less than 0.5% levied on private foreign exchange trades and
collected by national governments could generate about 150 billion dollars per year.42
User fees for ocean uses such as high seas "shing, ocean dumping and maritime
transport have also been advocated [70].
A common taxation approach is often suggested. National governments would
agree to collect fees and pass along contributions to an international funding mecha-
nism. However, national user fees and pollution fees are also possible as well as resort
to regional trust funds [7, pp. 42}44].
Practical di$culties in addressing compliance with and enforcement of interna-
tional environmental agreements also remain [71]. Monitoring vast o!shore areas is
a "nancial and practical challenge even for the wealthiest of states. Enforcement of
conservation obligations on the high seas has been particularly problematic where
`#ag statea jurisdiction has largely prevailed [72,73]. A proposed solution of a new
International Marine Monitoring and Coordination Agency with broad inspection
and investigation powers [74] seems unlikely given state concerns over jurisdiction
and perhaps preferences to deal with enforcement at the regional level.
8. Visioning the paths of oceans governance for the future
The end of the road has not yet been reached in sustainable oceans governance at
the international level. Fragmentation in addressing environmental crises has been
prevalent with separate treaty regimes for ozone depletion, climate change, biodiver-
sity and maritime transport. Soft law approaches prevail for addressing land-based
pollution/activities and the problems of small island developing states.
The Independent World Commission on the Oceans in its 1998 Report [75]
suggested a number of possible innovations. Avoiding recommendations for powerful
new institutions mandated and provided with authority to manage the oceans in
peaceful and equitable ways, the Commission o!ered less extreme options. Those
options included, among others: forming regional commissions for sustainable devel-
opment where they presently do not exist to involve representatives from ministries of
"nance/development and local levels to monitor progress in sustainable development;
convening of a United Nations Conference on Ocean A!airs to raise the pro"le of
ocean governance issues; and establishing an Independent World Ocean Forum
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involving civil society and all stakeholders in comprehensive reviews of ocean issues
every three or four years [75, pp. 153}161].
The UN Commission on Sustainable Development, reviewing oceans and seas at
the 7th Session in 1999, adopted cautious recommendations on improving coopera-
tion and coordination in the maritime area. The Commission recommended that the
General Assembly establish an open-ended informal consultative process each year
for a week to promote discussion and consideration of ocean issues. How imput from
representatives from major groups will be best achieved was left open with the
possibility of organizing discussion panels suggested [76].
9. Conclusions
These seven challenges may seem so formidable as to leave the reader with
a `sinkinga feeling. At the end of the 19th century, unlike the 18th, it was fashionable,
at least in the artistic/literary community, to indulge in pessimism, or even despair, as
a reaction to materialism, industrial blight, vested interests, and other perceived ills.
But despair, in the year 1900 coexisted with buoyancy in the scienti"c community,
which had reason to celebrate many evidences of intellectual progress and to anticip-
ate huge advances in professional research in a new age of civilization to be based
essentially on expertise. Now, on the brink of the 21st century, it is fashionable to
challenge the primacy of professional (elite) knowledge- or, more accurately, of
professional judgment based on technical, sectorized knowledge. We are moving now
from an age of specialized knowledge to an age of freely available, raw or semi-
professional, information.
This, perhaps the dominant social trend in the early decades of the 21st century,
suggests we shall encounter a continuing growth in the `transnational ethical com-
munitya, in its environmental as well as its human rights components. Increasingly, we
believe, governments and inter-governmental organizations will "nd their legitimacy
questioned at least in these two contexts, by citizens and citizen groups armed with
masses of information, much of it perhaps of imperfect reliability but assuming, for
political purposes, the functional equivalence of fact. The volume of information and
the number of believers will have more in#uence on environmental policy-making
than ever before, possibly enough to win most of the battles with scienti"c and other
technical elites.
We believe that a general belief in systemic failure is already evident and will provide
the dominant motif in a growing number of environmental issue areas. Popular
environmental prescriptions will become more radical, creating strains within the
framework of IEL whose guardianship will still remain in the hands of a relatively
conservative, and mostly positivist, majority or `mainstreama. Natural law, we
suspect, will continue to labour in its struggle with positivism in the judicial domain,
but will "nd new allies on the outside, in the `transnational ethical communitya.
Whether jurisprudential changes and new coalitions will be enough to allow the
human species to avoid sinking beneath powerful currents of consumerism, over-
consumption and population growth remains to be seen.
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